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Abstract
Managing innovation requires two distinctive sets of organizational abilities: the ability to push the technological frontier
and create new knowledge, and the ability to refine existing technologies and deliver products into market. While both
are essential to survival, they are generally seen as conflicting strategies. In this conceptual paper, we focus on R&D
collaboration as a strategy to solve the dilemma of exploration and exploitation. We suggest that cooperative R&D
organizations are distinguishable by their initial strategic intent, to either explore new knowledge or exploit existing
capabilities, but face similar tensions described in individual organizations when attempting to simultaneously pursue
high levels of both activities. Cooperative R&D bodies are, hence, a unique sampling frame. Like individual firms,
cooperative R&D organizations suffer similar pressures in moving innovations from lab to market. But differently, they
add a political dimension: to successfully operate, managers must champion innovations against different organizational
systems, strategic contexts and time horizons. We suggest that managers are called upon not only to reconcile
conflicting expectations of member companies; they are also looked to for creating organizational linkages to support
multiple structures, and strategies. Otherwise, we risk observing a plethora of organizations getting stuck in the middle
of local peaks.
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Types and traps: R&D consortia and developmental pitfalls.  
When the solution to the dilemma of exploration and exploitation itself becomes a problem. 
Towards a conceptual model in collaborative R&D entities. 
 
ABSTRACT 
Managing innovation requires two distinctive sets of organizational abilities: the ability to push the 
technological frontier and create new knowledge, and the ability to refine existing technologies and deliver 
products into market. While both are essential to survival, they are generally seen as conflicting strategies. In 
this conceptual paper, we focus on R&D collaboration as a strategy to solve the dilemma of exploration and 
exploitation. We suggest that cooperative R&D organizations are distinguishable by their initial strategic intent, 
to either explore new knowledge or exploit existing capabilities, but face similar tensions described in individual 
organizations when attempting to simultaneously pursue high levels of both activities. Cooperative R&D bodies 
are, hence, a unique sampling frame. Like individual firms, cooperative R&D organizations suffer similar 
pressures in moving innovations from lab to market. But differently, they add a political dimension: to 
successfully operate, managers must champion innovations against different organizational systems, strategic 
contexts and time horizons. We suggest that managers are called upon not only to reconcile conflicting 
expectations of member companies; they are also looked to for creating organizational linkages to support 
multiple structures, and strategies. Otherwise, we risk observing a plethora of organizations getting stuck in the 
middle of local peaks. 
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INTRODUCTION 
To survive and prosper when attempting to innovate, organizations are expected to navigate 
throughout several tensions. As suggested by Eisenhardt (2000), paradoxes or tensions in 
organizations appear in many forms. Although prevailing categorizations appropriately cover 
the tensions that may arise in stand-alone organizations, little research focuses on the 
interplay between organizational design, tensions and integration mechanisms and the 
influence they have in exploration and exploitation outcomes in cooperative R&D entities.  
The scholarly literature has used the conceptual distinction between exploration and 
exploitation to indicate the hazards of innovation in a wide range of organizational studies 
(He & Wong, 2004), including organizational design (Jansen, Tempelaar, van den Bosch, & 
Volberda, 2009; Menguc & Auh, 2010; Rivkin & Siggelkow, 2003; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 
2003), organizational learning (Beckman, 2006; Levinthal & March, 1993; Lichtenthaler, 
2009), organizational change and adaptation (Brion, Mothe, & Sabatier, 2010; Brown & 
Eisenhardt, 1997; Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996) and new product 
development (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009; de Visser, de Weerd-Nederhof, Faems, Song, 
van Looy, & Visscher, 2010). From an organizational perspective, exploration is associated 
with variation, scanning, creativity, path breaking, and recombination; where exploitation is 
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associated with selection, adaptation, routines and structures (He & Wong, 2004; Zollo & 
Winter, 2002). Via exploration, organizations seek out new alternatives to effectively respond 
to new challenges (March, 1994: 47). Via exploitation, they seek to refine existing 
capabilities and technologies to implement options that prove effective (March, 1991, 1994).  
This distinction creates the need for a structural balancing act within the organization 
to survive and prosper. Prior studies provided evidence for the idea that ambidextrous (as 
opposed to focused) organizations are better equipped to succeed in a dynamic environment 
(He & Wong, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). Ambidextrous organizations achieve 
alignment and efficiency around current core products, while remaining adaptive enough to 
manage disruptive innovations to assure long-term survival (Christensen, Raynor, & 
Anthony, 2003).  
However, the problem remains that balancing acts are difficult and expensive to 
sustain (Gibson & Birkinshaw, 2004; Levinthal & March, 1993). The ability to create and 
profit from innovation requires the existence of two different spaces,  each one demanding its 
own structure, strategy, people and culture (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007). Where expanding 
the technological frontier (exploration) requires extensive research spending, 
experimentation, and flexible and fluid structures; transforming ideas into products 
(exploitation) requires efficiency, control and coordination between many functions, 
including R&D, production and marketing (Miotti & Sachwald, 2003: 1493). Exploration and 
exploitation have also different profitability structures (Puhan, 2008). Where exploitative 
activities can boost the probability of short-term success as “innovations move along the 
traditional performance trajectory” (Christensen et al., 2003: 3), if not combined with 
explorative activities, it may constrain the organizational ability to shape future markets and 
succeed in the long-term  (Jansen, 2008). This potentially creates a managerial dilemma for 
organizations, which involves the dual search for certainty and flexibility in a context where 
both logics compete for resources and strategic focus (Smith & Tushman, 2005). Not 
surprisingly, organizations are increasingly experiencing conflicting demands as a result of 
creating and maintaining “dual structures” to master both foci (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006; Mc 
Namara & Baden-Fuller, 2007). 
More recently, the literature has suggested that inter-firm collaborative alliances and 
consortia can overcome the limits of the individual firms in encompassing incremental 
(exploration) and radical (exploitation) innovations (Grant & Baden-Fuller, 2004; Rothaermel 
& Deeds, 2004). The literature has termed this co-specialization strategy as spatial separation 
(Christensen, 1997; Levitt & March, 1988), and more recently, interorganizational 
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ambidexterity (Puhan, 2008). Collaborative forms enable participant firms to focus on core 
competences that are critical to defend a unique position in the market (Prahalad & Hamel, 
1990), while facilitating the absorption of new, external knowledge (Dyer & Singh, 1998; 
Teece & Pisano, 1994). Furthermore, as the costs and risks of research and development 
mount, these collaborative organizations, whether called R&D alliances, R&D consortia or 
strategic partnerships, have emerged as a functional instrument for enhancing innovativeness 
and economic performance in firms, while significantly reducing these risks (Dodgson, 
Mathews, & Kastelle, 2006; Gulati, Nohria, & Zaheer, 2000; Mathews, 2002).     
Research aim 
Of particular interest of this paper is an examination of the role played by R&D consortia in 
solving the dilemma of exploration and exploitation (Christensen, 1997; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006) from a theoretical perspective. We aim to understand the relationships between the 
characteristics of the R&D consortia, the role they have in enhancing R&D activities linked 
to exploration and exploitation, and their potential managerial tensions or tradeoffs. To 
develop our conceptual framework, we build upon Koza and Lewin’s (1998, 1999, 2000) 
conceptualization of three types of strategic alliances, namely learning, business and hybrid, 
to propose a similar model of R&D consortia.  
As our starting point, we define an R&D consortium as a legal entity formed by a 
group of autonomous organizations linked by cooperation agreements conducting associated 
research and development activities (Doz, Olk, & Ring, 2000; Mothe & Quelin, 2001). We 
argue that  R&D consortia are distinguishable by their initial strategic intent, to either explore 
new knowledge or exploit existing capabilities (Koza & Lewin, 1998, 2000), but face similar 
tensions described in individual organizations when attempting to simultaneously pursue high 
levels of both activities, in spite of having a larger potential set of available skills and 
resources coming from participating firms (Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 
2006). Cooperative R&D bodies are, hence, a unique sampling frame. Like individual firms, 
cooperative R&D organizations suffer similar pressures to moving innovations from lab to 
market (Lubatkin, Simsek, Ling, & Veiga, 2006; Markham, 2002). But differently, they add a 
political dimension: to successfully operate, managers must  champion innovations against 
different organizational systems, strategic contexts and time horizons (Hoang & Rothaermel, 
2010). 
Expanding on the model, we explain the risks associated with executing two strategies 
which initially appear incompatible or at least competing and elaborate on the concept of 
stuck in the middle (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Porter, 1980; Raisch & Birkinshaw, 2008). 
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We suggest that when a cooperative R&D organization is forced to move upstream (forward) 
or downstream (backward) in the product development process under a situation of resource 
and capabilities constraints, it risks mismanaging both strategies and destroying value 
(Markides & Charitou, 2004). We also suggest that each form has embedded associated risks 
or tradeoffs that need to be considered when launching a specific type of collaborative 
organization.  
In this paper, we do not address public policies issues, which are often associated with 
the role that governments and national innovation systems have played in promoting 
technology programs to enhance innovation and competitiveness (Busom & Fernández-
Ribas, 2008; Klette, Møen, & Griliches, 2000; Tikoria, Banwet, & Deshmukh, 2010). 
Instead, we choose to concentrate on the managerial problems associated with articulating 
contradictory organizational demands in an R&D consortium setting. As such, this paper will 
focus more on the tensions rather than on the benefits of each type of R&D consortia. In 
doing so, we implicitly recognize the key role that successful R&D consortia has had in many 
countries to advance technologies that could not have been addressed by individual firms, 
such as the cases of Microelectronics and Computer Technology Corporation (MCC) (Peck, 
1986), Semiconductor Manufacturing Technology (SEMATECH) and the Center for 
Advanced Television Studies (CATS) in the U.S. (Irwin & Klenow, 1996; Link, Teece, & 
Finan, 1996), the Very Large Scale Integrated (VLSI) circuits TRA, and the Opt-Electronics 
Applied System TRA in Japan (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Sakakibara, 1997), the Laptop, then 
New, PC Consortium in Taiwan (Mathews, 2002), and EUREKA in Europe (Mothe & 
Quelin, 2000).  The practical implication of this model is that organizational theory can be 
linked more closely to the design of cooperative R&D entities. In that sense, we consider our 
model as an intermediate step in the development of a more complex model that could 
account for design issues that incorporates the mediator role of integrating or conjoint 
mechanisms as enabler for a better coordination between organizations and across 
incremental and radical innovations.   
This paper is organized as follows. We begin with a brief revision of the exploration 
and exploitation motives for firms to participate in a consortium. Next, we describe the types 
of R&D consortia, to then categorize the traps or tensions that are associated with each type. 
In the final section, conclusions are presented. 
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TOWARDS A TAXONOMY OF R&D CONSORTIA 
Motives for participating in R&D consortia  
The literature indicates that the design of R&D consortia is largely determined by the 
objectives and expectations of the participating firms, and this variation may lead to 
differences in their outcomes (Dacin, Hitt, & Levitas, 1997; Gomes-Casseres, Hagedoorn, & 
Jaffe, 2006). Koza and Lewin (1998: 256) suggested that a firm’s motives to participate in 
cooperative R&D “can be distinguished in terms of its motivation to exploit an existing 
capability or to explore for new opportunities”.  
The literature displays an impressive list of exploration to exploitation motives for 
why firms enter into cooperative relations (Nielsen, 2010). Where the former are associated 
with the firm’s decision to improve its ability to recognize, assimilate and apply new, 
external, knowledge to commercial ends (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990; Gulati, 1998, 1999); gain 
access to attractive yet unfamiliar business (Contractor & Lorange, 1988); and diversify its 
portfolio of products and services while hedging the risk of being either locked into old 
technologies or products or locked-out of critical new technologies (Branstetter & 
Sakakibara, 2002; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003). The latter are linked to the firm’s decision to 
gain access to complementary resources and capabilities difficult to find in open markets 
(Khanna, Gulati, & Nohria, 1998; Koza & Lewin, 2000; Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 
1996); increase market power (Hagedoorn, Link, & Vonortas, 2000; Porter & Fuller, 1986); 
and reduce the costs of innovation via economies of scale and scope, whilst avoiding the risks 
of full-scale merger (Contractor & Lorange, 2002).  
An R&D consortium is also a powerful mechanism to restore socially optimal levels 
of R&D investment (Spence, 1984), and correct failures in the R&D market associated with 
imperfect appropriability (e.g. high spillovers), and asymmetric information that provide a  
disincentive for firms to undertake individual R&D projects (Katz, 1986). These incentive 
problems involve the strategic decision of the firm to interact with public and private actors 
(Binenbaum, 2008). The firm’s decision to participate in an R&D consortium is then an 
organizational response to market and environmental dynamics. The economic globalization 
and the internationalization of the intellectual property protection, among other contextual 
changes, has laid pressure on firms to simultaneously meet large-scale and local needs, while 
the active role of triggering entities (e.g. national and local governments via subsidies and 
regulations, universities and local agencies) has provided them with the necessary funding to 
downsize the risks (Contractor & Lorange, 2002; Mowery, Oxley, & Silverman, 1998).   
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Types of R&D consortia 
The literature suggests that collaborative organizations cannot be treated in a uniform 
fashion. Following the pioneering work of Koza and Lewin (1998, 1999, 2000), it has been 
argued that cooperative forms provide participating firms with separate specialized structures 
in either the discovery of new technologies or the commercialization of new products.  For 
example, Rosenkopf and Nerkar  (2001) observed that exploration outside the organizational 
borders brought firms with radical and broader use of technological streams far beyond their 
traditional markets, enlarging their business opportunities; and Rothaermel (2001) described 
an integrated product development path including technology venture alliances (exploration) 
and market venture alliances (exploitation) in the pharmaceutical industry to the benefit of 
major incumbents, who seem to survive and prosper in spite of the most radical changes in 
technology.  
Expanding upon the framework of learning, business and hybrid alliances (Koza & 
Lewin, 2000), major aspects of R&D collaborative initiatives are discussed hereafter to 
suggest a model of R&D consortia.  
Learning Cooperative R&D Organizations 
Learning cooperative R&D organizations (LCOs) are established to explore territories where 
technologies are either immature or very expensive to develop (Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004). 
As such, LCOs put a very marked emphasis on the research (“R”) components of the 
innovation process, “enabling partners to share tacit knowledge and develop new knowledge” 
(Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: 799). Six common blueprints are predominant in learning-like 
R&D consortia. First, the formation of LCOs follows an engineered, designed pattern, that 
is, it is driven by the action of a triggering entity (Doz et al., 2000; Hall, 1972). Triggering 
entities act as innovator catalysts; they actively bring together partners around a common 
subject and procure initial funding to encourage collaborative endeavors. Although the 
literature suggests “that triggering entities may be individuals, firms, agencies of 
governments, or environmental events” (Doz et al., 2000: 241), a significant impact in the 
emergence of collaborative partnerships comes from public R&D supported programs 
(Arranz & Fernández de Arroyabe, 2008). As such, R&D consortia “are then expected to 
recruit enough industry participants and financial contributors to become self-sustaining” 
(Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995: 303). 
Second, parties view collaboration as a learning rather than a commercial platform. 
Their aim is “the expansion of generic-knowledge research, rather than the development of 
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patentable or commercialized products” (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995: 303), so that they serve the 
needs of firms to more effectively share complementary knowledge, increase their awareness 
of R&D, and train their research staff (Branstetter & Sakakibara, 2002; Sakakibara, 1997).  
Third, their activities are concentrated more over the first stages of the innovation 
cycle, between joint facilities and member firms, and between public and private 
organizations as they tend to place fewer restrictions on the members’ participation (Aldrich 
& Sasaki, 1995). The emphasis here of the R&D consortia is more focused on precompetitive 
research rather than on the diffusion of existing knowledge to firms so they can prepare for 
integrating new technologies (Mothe & Quelin, 2001). 
Fourth, given the nature of the task, cooperation agreements involve a broad variety 
of organizations, including suppliers or customers (vertical), universities and research 
institutes (institutional cooperation), and competitors (horizontal) (Belderbos, Carree, 
Diederen, Lokshin, & Veugelers, 2004). When working with competitors, though, firms 
collaborate in distant space opportunities from their current markets leading to generic 
discoveries in order to avoid potential leaks of knowledge not readily protected (Baum, 
Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Miotti & Sachwald, 2003).  
Fifth, learning as opposed to other forms of collaborative organizations, are 
commonly implemented as open-ended, less specific, cooperative development ventures. 
Moreover, LCOs memberships vary over time –as certain members leave and others join-, 
and these variations lead to changes in the R&D consortium’s goals over time (Evan & Olk, 
1990).  
Finally, LCOs show patterns of an organic rather than a mechanic organizational 
form (Burns & Stalker, 1961). They promote explorative outcomes (e.g. patents, 
publications) as a result of having loosely coupled structures, decentralized units, informal 
relations and flexible boundaries as opposed to more hierarchical structures, centralized 
decision-making process and formal controls and communication channels that are used in 
business oriented R&D consortia to decrease the risk of undesired spillovers and information 
leaks (He & Wong, 2004; Jansen, Van Den Bosch, & Volberda, 2006). Thus, in situations 
with a single or dominant demand that privileges exploration functions, learning compared to 
business R&D consortia will tend to have a looser structure intended to facilitate creativity, 
capability development and long-term growth (Nielsen, 2010).  
Business Cooperative R&D Organizations 
The primary intent for business cooperative R&D organizations (BCOs) is to help founding 
firms to establish a successful commercial position in a new market or sustain a competitive 
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position in an existing market. Subsequently, they are concentrated more in applied research 
(product development and prototype/pilot plants) and commercialization stages (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). Exploitation-like R&D consortia show six distinctive features. First, they 
follow an emergent pattern which is reflected in the interest of founder members to limit 
partnerships to a similar type of entities and to direct most funding to respond to common 
threats or to changes in the environment (i.e. technology) affecting their competitive position 
(Doz et al., 2000).  As suggested by Katz (1986), this situation is linked to the degree of 
development of the industry. In competitive industries firms are “more motivated to form 
R&D consortia to ease the subsequent product market competition” (Sakakibara & Dodgson, 
2003: 234); and therefore improve their position in the market, while using cooperative 
agreements to reduce duplicative R&D expenditures (see also Irwin & Klenow, 1996).         
Second, they are conceived as functional instruments (Mathews, 2002). Partnerships 
are typically undertaken to work in a singular project and often of limited duration, hence 
terminated after reaching their goals or when key members abandon the R&D consortia.  
Third, their work is focused on research with a commercial application. BCOs occur 
further down the innovation chain, “when firms collaborate by pooling technology and funds 
to commercialize or coproduce a product” (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995: 303). The strength of 
BCOs is, hence, in the diffusion of existing rather than in the creation of new, technologies 
across partners (Dodgson et al., 2006: 96).  
Fourth, given the need to use complementary as opposed to similar capabilities, BCOs 
tend to restrict horizontal relationships and the incorporation of newcomers into the group. 
Where direct competitors are brought together by strong common business interests to 
combine complementary, but scarce, resources or capabilities “which results in the joint 
creation of unique new products, services, or technologies (Dyer & Singh, 1998: 662), 
vertical relationships are far more frequent. Since, by definition, relationships with both 
suppliers and customers provide insightful technological and product information directly 
from the market, and by extension, comprise far less risk of opportunistic behaviors 
compared to horizontal cooperation, they may serve better to enhance exploitative rather than 
explorative innovation (Arranz & Fernández de Arroyabe, 2008: 97).  
Fifth, BCOs are designed to minimize opportunistic behaviors among members, 
thereby organized around well-defined contracts and measurable operational objectives 
(Koza & Lewin, 2000; Nielsen, 2010). BCOs perform only research that is protected via 
equity agreements (Hagedoorn et al., 2000).   
  
 
- 9 - 
 
Finally, a BCO displays a more rigid formal, hierarchical structure than its counterpart 
the LCO, aimed to promote a rapid transit of the new technology to the market (Jansen et al., 
2006). Thus, in situations with a single or dominant demand that privileges exploitation 
functions, business compared to learning R&D consortia will tend to have a vertical, 
centralized structure, arranged in a cascade of authority and communication relations, 
intended to facilitate execution and short-term growth (Perretti & Negro, 2006).  
Hybrid Cooperative R&D Organizations 
A third basic form involves hybrid or ambidextrous cooperative R&D organizations (HCOs), 
which connect companies that seek to simultaneously maximize opportunities for both value 
creation and value capturing (Koza & Lewin, 2000: 149). HCOs combine properties from 
both learning and business collaborative organizations, and features of ambidextrous 
organizations. Accordingly, a high level of partner involvement is far more essential for 
hybrid organizations due to the fact that they seek a major transformation outcome in  
multiple time horizons (Koza & Lewin, 2000: 149). As a result of concentrating the efforts in 
the development and commercialization of new technologies, by using hybrid forms, partner 
firms can benefit from economies of scale and scope that arise from the combination of 
specific assets to develop a major blockbuster, securing new, future, revenues “to increase the 
odds of dramatic gains” (Koza & Lewin, 2000: 149).  
 Although from a theoretical perspective it can be assumed that HCOs effectively 
combine all the features of both learning and business R&D consortia, in practical terms it is 
very unlikely. Henceforth, we have more questions than certainties in this regard. To our 
recollection, the formal literature on R&D consortia does not provide examples of hybrid 
cases, and in most situations, a focused strategy is suggested (e.g. Branstetter & Sakakibara, 
2002; Mathews, 2002; Rothaermel & Deeds, 2004) and, in others cases where exploration 
and exploitation outcomes are observed as result of strategic partnerships, the examples are 
more representatives of individual firm/supplier relationships (often in the form of a cluster) 
–as in the cases of Samsung Electronics in Korea or Ericsson in China (Dodgson et al., 
2006)-, vendor/customer relationships –as in the case of SupplyChainCo in the U.S. (Im & 
Rai, 2008), or a more general form of alliance between independent firms (Holmqvist, 2004; 
Kale & Singh, 2007; Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006).  A potential explanation for this situation 
may be found in the fact that although the research agenda in an R&D consortium is 
implemented on the basis of specific projects approved by the board of directors, and 
members share the initial costs associated with each program, successful projects are often 
carry out under more specific modalities, which in many cases imply that the R&D 
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consortium creates an alliance or a separate firm to commercialize promising projects 
(Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Mothe & Quelin, 2001). In that sense, more often, R&D consortia 
focus more on the earlier (e.g. basic research, pilot testing) as opposed to the later (e.g. 
commercialization) stages in the development chain.  We can summarize these concerns 
around the following three issues:  
First, if learning outcomes in more restricted business operations are inhibited by 
narrowly defined domain consensus, unrealistic expectations of continuity or over-
engineering of structure (Doz et al., 2000), business operations will likely suffer from a lack 
of focus if an R&D consortium wants to search for a new, radical innovation. The problem is 
whether an R&D consortium can effectively balance both exploration and exploitation 
without losing momentum in one activity.   
Second, the literature on organizational theory suggests that ambidextrous as opposed 
to focused organizations are better equipped to succeed in a dynamic environment (Gibson & 
Birkinshaw, 2004; He & Wong, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 1996). However, it is not clear 
whether a problem that is very complex for individual firms can be effectively tackled by a 
supracorporate, more complex entity that is not completely detached from its parent firms 
(Evan & Olk, 1990), especially considering the political dimensions of an R&D consortium 
(Hoang & Rothaermel, 2010).   
Finally, it has been suggested that performance can be improved through learning 
(March, 1991).  Therefore, the question to pose is whether an R&D consortium that is 
positioned to perform one activity at a time can learn to become ambidextrous. And if so, 
what are the mechanisms used to facilitate this process?     
These concerns prompt us to suggest that under determined circumstances, the 
solution to the dilemma of exploration and exploitation itself becomes a problem and the 
search for ambidexterity may impinge on the survival of an R&D consortium. In the 
following section, we deepen our understanding of these issues to identify traps or tensions 
associated with each form that may transform an R&D consortium into a dysfunctional 
instrument. 
For a brief description of cooperative R&D organizations, see Table 1: 
------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
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Associated traps and tensions in R&D consortia 
Collaborative R&D projects are critical to innovation and growth, but often plagued by 
organizational challenges (Chao, Lichtendahl, & Grushka-Cockayne, 2011). From a general 
perspective, managerial problems in cooperative forms encompass: organizational design 
(Aggarwal & Hsu, 2009; Ireland, Hitt, & Vaidyanath, 2002); legal issues (Hagedoorn et al., 
2000); resourcing (Evan & Olk, 1990); membership involvement and turnover (Belderbos et 
al., 2004; Mothe & Quelin, 2001); decision making (Aldrich & Sasaki, 1995; Branstetter & 
Sakakibara, 2002); convergence of interests and governance structure (Gulati, 1998; 
Linnarsson & Werr, 2004); opportunistic behaviors, holdups and underinvestment 
(Binenbaum, 2008; Heiman & Nickerson, 2004); and producing and evaluating outputs (Link 
et al., 1996; Sakakibara & Dodgson, 2003). 
From a more specific perspective, and consistent with the view put forth by Koza and 
Lewin (2000: 148), we suggest that each R&D cooperative arrangement embodies a unique 
level of risk/return tradeoffs for the parties and demands a specific set of management 
process. Like other types of organizations, collaborative organizations are specific purpose 
instruments. Even though there are, a priori, many ways of designing an organization, but 
once that decision is taken, the investments made in a specific design itself becomes specific 
and irreversible, constraining future decisions (Eriksen, 2006; Gresov & Drazin, 1997).  
Furthermore, tensions between exploration and exploitation are more likely to 
escalate destructively and negatively impact outcomes in an R&D consortium setting as 
opposed to the case of an individual firm given the nature of collaborative arrangements 
(Alic, 1990; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). As observed by Nielsen (2010: 685), while individual 
firms “may control the internal balance between exploration and exploitation by adjusting 
aspirations, beliefs, feedback, incentives, and socialization or selection processes”; in 
cooperative forms, partners different perceptions about how much to dedicate to one or 
another activity may lead to strategic misfits, unless resolved through a process of common 
adaptation, suboptimal solutions and a higher predisposition to failure. The need to develop 
multi-level structural linkages in R&D consortia to solve divergence of interests across its 
multiple efforts at both the intra and the extra-organization units becomes, thus, paramount to 
the realization of superior performance, while preventing high instability and group 
disbandment (Linnarsson & Werr, 2004).   
Managing R&D collaboration raises an additional and long visited dilemma for the 
parties: opening the venue to value creation in collaborative forms, creates favorable 
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conditions to opportunistic behaviors, exposing valuable and unprotected knowledge to 
expropriation (Heiman & Nickerson, 2004). Opportunist behaviors impact more strongly on 
business R&D consortia than others, as LCOs are established to exchange less delicate 
information without irreversible involvement and in far-from-market areas leading to generic 
discoveries (Mothe & Quelin, 2001).  
Another source of tension emerges when an R&D consortium is incapable of 
successfully readapting its configuration to changes occurring in the member firms. Changes 
occur at two levels. At the consortium level, membership composition changes over time, as 
certain members leave and others join (Mothe & Quelin, 2001). This requires an extra effort 
from consortium managers not only to actively engage in promotional activities aimed to 
recruit new members but also to then settle and harmonize common interests between the old 
order and the expectations of the new members (Evan & Olk, 1990).  There are also changes 
at the individual firm level. For example, a change in the ownership or at the top management 
level of a member firm can lead to a change in the corporate strategy, impacting the firm’s 
propensity to collaborate. In that sense, tensions in R&D consortia emerge not only from 
differences in management styles between partners (Kumar & Nti, 1998); they also appear 
because member firms shift their strategies due to problems derived from “cultural 
differences, organizational challenges and competitive difficulties” (Reuer, 2000: 5).  
Membership involvement and turnover occur more frequently on learning R&D 
consortia than others, as they often cover more general, non-equity agreements, and therefore, 
are more flexible instruments to allow the participation of new firms. However, changes in 
membership composition are more frequent in LCOs –as the diversity and lack of domain 
similarities (e.g. a minimum level of relevant factual knowledge, skills and technical 
proficiency, size, target market and time orientations) between partners characteristic of 
LCOs may cause more repeated conflicts than in other types of consortia (Provan & Kenis, 
2007)-, the consequences for BCOs are more catastrophic. Business, and by association 
hybrid, R&D consortia are dependent upon the strong commitment of the partners and 
combine R&D skills and resources through equity joint ownership (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
Once a member leaves, the entity is subsequently terminated. The same reasoning is 
applicable for their projects. If certain learning R&D consortia projects “are not successful, 
they can be terminated with only a relatively small loss compared to the loss that would be 
incurred when a research [business] corporation is dissolved” (Hagedoorn et al., 2000: 570 
[word in parentheses is not in the original.]). 
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Finally, complex arrangements are more difficult to manage, and then the costs and 
benefits are not equally shared. As complexity escalates, for example in the case of 
ambidextrous or dual oriented R&D consortia, so too does the costs of maintaining 
connections among mature and revolutionary technologies (Tushman & Nadler, 1978; Van 
Looy, Martens, & Debackere, 2005). An ambidextrous formation of consortia benefits large 
(as opposed to small) firms, given the restrictions on funding, lack of slack resources and 
small margin for error typically associated with small firms (Lin, Yang, & Demirkan, 2007).  
The preceding arguments suggest that a consortium is, then, at risk of becoming 
“stuck in the middle” (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007; Porter, 1980) when the tensions that are 
intrinsic to high levels of exploration and exploitation become unmanageable (He & Wong, 
2004). Put differently, the need to strive for an effective balance between exploration and 
exploitation must be weighed against the potential costs and alignment problems to deal with 
different logics (Cegarra-Navarro & Dewhurst, 2007), particularly considering that R&D 
consortia tend to magnify the inherent problems of research found in stand-alone 
organizations (Ghemawat & Costa, 1993; Peck, 1986).  
Figure 1 depicts each type of R&D consortium and associated risks or potential traps:  
------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
------------------------------- 
Trap 1: misfit trap 
The current literature argues that, whatever their source, tensions inevitably diminish the 
organizational fit, and lead towards unstable relationships, negatively impacting performance 
(Kumar & Nti, 1998; Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). For instance, Porter (1996: 70) 
suggested that structures, systems and processes require to reflect the tradeoffs rules, so 
organizations could focus on core competencies, critical resources and key success factors. 
For Gulati and Puranam (2009) inconsistencies between formal and informal structures 
inevitably create internal fit problems, enhancing the hazards of organizational mortality, 
although conflicts can be a stimulant to ambidexterity. However, in complex systems, such as 
R&D consortia, the notion of internal fit, that is, the call for consistency between 
organizational elements (i.e. strategy, structure and activities) needs to be balanced with the 
notion of external fit, that is, the need for consistency between organizational design and 
environmental conditions (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). In this context, Siggelkow (2001: 
838) observed that a tightly coupled, ambidextrous organizations may have even more 
difficulties to adapting to such changes, since “coupling requires a firm to modify many 
choices simultaneously, an inherently difficult task”.  
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Expanding the notion of fit beyond the firm level, it can be inferred that an R&D 
consortium attempting to pursue an ambidextrous position under either a resource constrained 
scenario (Cao, Gedajlovic, & Zhang, 2009) or lacking broad management skills and abilities 
to develop learning mechanisms to sustain both foci (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007) may suffer 
effort dispersion in fragmentary activities, leading to a negative circle of unfinished projects 
(Copani, Bosani, Tosatti, & Azevedo, 2006).   
Furthermore, the managerial failure to adequately respond and adapt to internal and 
external conflicting demands may preclude the termination of an R&D consortium. We use 
the term misfit trap (Tiwana, Bharadwaj, & Sambamurthy, 2004) in the setting of R&D 
consortia to refer to alignment problems between the organizational design and both internal 
and external demands that negatively impact on performance. Where internal demands are 
associated with conflicts in the relationship between organizational structure and the role of 
research (i.e. how much exploration versus how much exploitation); in this setting, external 
demands are associated with changes in the environmental conditions (i.e. technology, 
regulations), and at the membership composition of the consortia.  
Traps 2 and 3: Competency and learning traps 
However, vicious cycles or traps (Andriopoulos & Lewis, 2009) have also been extensively 
described in organizations whose strategic tendency is to exclusively focus on exploitation 
activities, a propensity known as “competency trap” (Leonard-Barton, 1992) and in which 
past success and the promise of immediate returns lead management to strategic persistence 
(Audia, Locke, & Smith, 2000), driving out explorative activity (O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007), 
or, conversely, in organizations that focus on exploration activities, a trend named “failure 
trap” (Levinthal & March, 1993), and in which unsuccessful past results in knowledge 
creation lead to a continuous changing in searching options in which exploration drives out 
exploitation (Gupta, Smith, & Shalley, 2006).   
Trap 4: Consensus trap 
The nature of collaboration may also engender a complementary failure type, which 
resembles the idea of a consensus trap described by Fiorino (1997). Consensus traps emerge 
from two distinguishing characteristics of R&D consortia referred to Evan and Olk (1990). 
First, as mentioned above, an R&D consortium represents a supracorporate organization that 
is not entirely detached from its member firms  (Evan & Olk, 1990: 40). This strategic and 
legal attachment creates tensions between the goals of a consortium and those of its members: 
while a consortium manager must invite all interested parties to provide inputs relevant to the 
objectives of the consortium, he/she must also control for the different needs of each parent 
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firm. His/her job is to develop an efficient decision-making procedure to arrive at consensus 
quickly, while reducing the internal conflicts that affect performance (Provan & Kenis, 
2007). Subsequently, managers are obliged to continuously rely on consultation and 
negotiation processes to set and execute a research agenda. To put it differently, in this 
borderless organization, members need to develop a shared understanding of the direction in 
which the relationship must go to compete successfully.  
Second, as suggested above, in its life-span, an R&D consortium is likely to 
experience membership losses, and as a result, consortium managers may need to recruit new 
members to replace members who have left or to help the consortium to grow, which in turn 
will alter the balance of power (Evan & Olk, 1990: 43). Essentially, to successfully conduct 
an R&D consortium, managers have to actively battle against the desire for control and 
involvement of each individual member, manage different expectations and time horizons as 
well as control for the “agreed” specifications to be delivered, on time and on budget. 
Consensus traps arise, thus, from the inability of the participating firms to commit to optimal 
decisions or due to the shifts in their preferences or composition, which in turn may create a 
vicious circle of dysfunctional behaviors inside a consortium.   
 We suggest that a consensus trap may affect all three types of R&D consortia, 
although we recognize that the effects may be more pervasive in a business oriented –and, by 
association, also a hybrid- consortium as the critical element in those two types are related to 
effective R&D project execution.  To illustrate the factor that a consensus trap will still affect 
all three, but also to recognize that the inability to manage this or any other trap described in 
this paper may produce equally negative results, we introduce a fourth type of R&D 
consortium, which we called dysfunctional or “stuck in the middle”.       
To sum up, in the setting of a collaborative R&D organization, the conflicting 
pressures which arise from the clash of the opposing logics of exploration and exploitation 
produce the emergence of four types of traps. In other words, to expropriate and modify  
Schumpeter´s phrase, all three types of collaborative R&D forms described by Koza and 
Lewin (2000) have embedded the germ of “destructive destruction”; in other words, the 
potential to become dysfunctional or “stuck in the middle”.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Studies report that a large fraction of R&D cooperative forms do not accomplish their 
original goals and many are disbanded (Das & Teng, 2000; Podolny & Page, 1998), which 
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implies that “many firms fail to realize the potential gains from partnering activity” (Gulati, 
Lavie, & Singh, 2009: 1213). Major reasons for these failures are found in the difficulties 
associated with the management of the R&D-related consortia (Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
Essentially, it takes considerable entrepreneurial effort to design an R&D consortium that 
successfully synchronizes both the “R” and the “D” stages of the product development. In 
this paper, we attempted to clarify the underlying factors that negatively impact the operation 
and outcome of R&D consortia. Using a basic model, we described four types and its 
associated traps. We suggest that those tensions, when not well manage, could originate a 
dysfunctional form of organization.    
Our model indicates that each cooperative alternative involves different risk/return 
tradeoffs for the parties, and that these tensions are amplified, in the setting of a collaborative 
R&D organization, by both internal and external dynamics. As such, consortium managers 
need to ensure that participating firms arrive at a shared cognitive model of the envisioned 
venture in order to ensure the inputs and disseminate the technology (Olk, 1998; Tiwana, 
2008). In that sense, as long as the availability of resources and competencies depends upon 
the contributions of individual member firms, collaborative R&D entities will face equity or 
membership conflicts, unless managers are successful in building relational capital based on 
trust and close interaction between partners (Kale, Singh, & Perlmutter, 2000).  
The practical implication of this model is that theory can be linked more closely to the 
design of R&D consortia. Far from providing definitive answers in this regard, our paper 
suggests questions that need to be addressed in the future.    
In summary, the dilemma for an R&D consortium is either to specialize or to become 
a dual player. As such, managers are called not only to reconcile the multiple -and sometimes 
colliding- expectations of member companies (Hagedoorn et al., 2000; Olk, 1998); they are 
also looked to for creating organizational linkages to support multiple structures, strategies 
and processes (Jansen et al., 2009; O'Reilly & Tushman, 2007). When trying to compete with 
a dual business model (Markides & Charitou, 2004), a collaborative organization is not only 
contingent on its own resources, but also on its ability to rapidly learn and develop 
organizational skills and capabilities to effectively integrate and build upon both strategies 
(Benner & Tushman, 2003). Otherwise, we risk observing a plethora of organizations getting 
stuck in the middle of local peaks (Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003). 
  
  
 
- 17 - 
 
REFERENCES 
Aggarwal, V. A., & Hsu, D. H. (2009). Modes of cooperative R&D commercialization by start-ups. Strategic 
Management Journal, 30(8), 835-864.  
Ahuja, G., & Morris Lampert, C. (2001). Entrepreneurship in the large corporation: a longitudinal study of how 
established firms create breakthrough inventions. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6-7), 521-543.  
Aldrich, H. E., & Sasaki, T. (1995). R&D consortia in the United States and Japan. Research Policy, 24(2), 301-
316.  
Alic, J. A. (1990). Cooperation in R&D. Technovation, 10(5), 319-332.  
Andriopoulos, C., & Lewis, M. W. (2009). Exploitation-Exploration Tensions and Organizational 
Ambidexterity: Managing Paradoxes of Innovation. Organization Science, 20(4), 696-717. doi: 
10.1287/orsc.1080.0406 
Argyres, N. S., & Silverman, B. S. (2004). R&D, organization structure, and the development of corporate 
technological knowledge. Strategic Management Journal, 25(8-9), 929-958.  
Arranz, N., & Fernández de Arroyabe, J. C. (2008). The choice of partners in R&D cooperation: An empirical 
analysis of Spanish firms. Technovation, 28(1-2), 88-100.  
Audia, P. G., Locke, E. A., & Smith, K. G. (2000). The Paradox of Success: An Archival and a Laboratory 
Study of Strategic Persistence Following Radical Environmental Change. The Academy of 
Management Journal, 43(5), 837-853.  
Baum, J. A. C., Calabrese, T., & Silverman, B. S. (2000). Don't Go It Alone: Alliance Network Composition 
and Startups' Performance in Canadian Biotechnology. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 267-294.  
Beckman, C. M. (2006). The influence of founding team company affiliations on firm behavior. [Article]. 
Academy of Management Journal, 49(4), 741-758.  
Belderbos, R., Carree, M., Diederen, B., Lokshin, B., & Veugelers, R. (2004). Heterogeneity in R&D 
cooperation strategies. International Journal of Industrial Organization, 22(8-9), 1237-1263. doi: DOI: 
10.1016/j.ijindorg.2004.08.001 
Benner, M. J., & Tushman, M. L. (2003). Exploitation, exploration, and process management: the productivity 
dilemma revisited. Academy of Management Review, 28(2), 238-256.  
Binenbaum, E. (2008). Incentive issues in R&D Consortia: Insights from Applied Game Theory. Contemporary 
Economic Policy, 26(4), 636-650.  
Branstetter, L. G., & Sakakibara, M. (2002). When Do Research Consortia Work Well and Why? Evidence from 
Japanese Panel Data. The American Economic Review, 92(1), 143-159.  
Brion, S., Mothe, C., & Sabatier, M. (2010). The impact of organisational context and competences on 
innovation ambidexterity. [Article]. International Journal of Innovation Management, 14(2), 151-178. 
doi: 10.1142/s1363919610002593 
Brown, S. L., & Eisenhardt, K. M. (1997). The Art of Continuous Change: Linking Complexity Theory and 
Time-Paced Evolution in Relentlessly Shifting Organizations. Administrative Science Quarterly, 42(1), 
1-34.  
Burns, T., & Stalker, G. (1961). The management of innovation. London: Tavistock. 
Busom, I., & Fernández-Ribas, A. (2008). The impact of firm participation in R&D programmes on R&D 
partnerships. Research Policy, 37(2), 240-257.  
Cao, Q., Gedajlovic, E., & Zhang, H. (2009). Unpacking Organizational Ambidexterity: Dimensions, 
Contingencies, and Synergistic Effects. Organization Science, 20(4), 781-796. doi: 
10.1287/orsc.1090.0426 
Cegarra-Navarro, J. G., & Dewhurst, F. (2007). Linking organizational learning and customer capital through an 
ambidexterity context: an empirical investigation in SMEs. The International Journal of Human 
Resource Management, 18(10), 1720 - 1735.  
Chao, R. O., Lichtendahl, K. C., Jr., & Grushka-Cockayne, Y. (2011). Incentives for Complex R&D Projects. 
SSRN eLibrary. Retrieved from http://ssrn.com/paper=1738531 
Christensen, C., Raynor, M., & Anthony, S. (2003). Six keys to creating new-growth businesses. Harvard 
Management Update, 8(1), 3.  
Christensen, C. M. (1997). The innovator's dilemma: when new technologies cause great firms to fail: Harvard 
Business School Press. 
Cohen, W. M., & Levinthal, D. A. (1990). Absorptive Capacity: A New Perspective on Learning and 
Innovation. Administrative Science Quarterly, 35(1), 128-152.  
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (2002). The growth of alliances in the knowledge-based economy. International 
Business Review, 11(4), 485-502.  
Contractor, F. J., & Lorange, P. (Eds.). (1988). Why should firms cooperate? The strategy and economics basis 
for cooperative ventures. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. 
Copani, G., Bosani, R., Tosatti, L. M., & Azevedo, A. (2006). A Structured Methodology for Business Network 
Design. European Commission through Project KoBaS.   
  
 
- 18 - 
 
Dacin, M. T., Hitt, M. A., & Levitas, E. (1997). Selecting partners for successful international alliances: 
Examination of U.S. and Korean firms. Journal of World Business, 32(1), 3-16.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2000). Instabilities of Strategic Alliances: An Internal Tensions Perspective. 
Organization Science, 11(1), 77-101.  
de Visser, M., de Weerd-Nederhof, P., Faems, D., Song, M., van Looy, B., & Visscher, K. (2010). Structural 
ambidexterity in NPD processes: A firm-level assessment of the impact of differentiated structures on 
innovation performance. Technovation, 30(5-6), 291-299.  
Dodgson, M., Mathews, J., & Kastelle, T. (2006). The evolving nature of research consortia in East Asia. 
Innovation: management, policy & practice, 8(1-2), 84-101. doi: DOI: 10.1016/j.respol.2007.12.005 
Doz, Y. L., Olk, P. M., & Ring, P. S. (2000). Formation Processes of R&D Consortia: Which Path to Take? 
Where Does It Lead? Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 239-266.  
Duncan, R. B. (1976). The ambidextrous organization: Designing dual structures for innovation. In R. H. 
Kilmann, L. R. Pondy & D. Slevin (Eds.), The management of organization (Vol. 1, pp. 167–188). 
New York: North-Holland. 
Dyer, J. H., & Singh, H. (1998). The Relational View: Cooperative Strategy and Sources of Interorganizational 
Competitive Advantage. The Academy of Management Review, 23(4), 660-679.  
Eisenhardt, K. M. (2000). Paradox, Spirals, Ambivalence: The New Language of Change and Pluralism. The 
Academy of Management Review, 25(4), 703-705.  
Eriksen, B. (2006). Organization design constraints on strategy and performance. In R. M. Burton, D. D. 
Håkonsson, B. Eriksen & C. C. Snow (Eds.), Organization Design: The Evolving State-of-the-Art: 
Springer Science+Business Media, LLC. 
Evan, W. M., & Olk, P. (1990). R&D Consortia: A New U.S. Organizational Form. Sloan Management Review, 
31(3), 37-46.  
Fiorino, D. (1997). Regulatory Policy and the Consensus Trap: An Agency Perspective. Analyse & Kritik, 19, 
64-76.  
Floyd, S., & Lane, P. (2000). Strategizing throughout the organization: Managing role conflict in strategic 
renewal. Academy of Management Review, 25(1), 154-177.  
Ghemawat, P., & Costa, J. E. R. I. (1993). The Organizational Tension between Static and Dynamic Efficiency. 
Strategic Management Journal, 14(ArticleType: primary_article / Issue Title: Special Issue: 
Organizations, Decision Making and Strategy / Full publication date: Winter, 1993 / Copyright © 1993 
John Wiley & Sons), 59-73.  
Gibson, C. B., & Birkinshaw, J. (2004). The Antecedents, Consequences, and Mediating Role of Organizational 
Ambidexterity. The Academy of Management Journal, 47(2), 209-226.  
Gilbert, C. G. (2006). Change in the Presence of Residual Fit: Can Competing Frames Coexist? Organization 
Science, 17(1), 150-167. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1050.0160 
Gomes-Casseres, B., Hagedoorn, J., & Jaffe, A. B. (2006). Do alliances promote knowledge flows? Journal of 
Financial Economics, 80(1), 5-33.  
Grant, R. M., & Baden-Fuller, C. (2004). A Knowledge Accessing Theory of Strategic Alliances. Journal of 
Management Studies, 41(1), 61-84.  
Gresov, C., & Drazin, R. (1997). Equifinality: Functional equivalence in organization design. Academy of 
Management Review (22), 403-428.  
Gulati, R. (1998). Alliances and Networks. Strategic Management Journal, 19(4), 293-317.  
Gulati, R. (1999). Network Location and Learning: The Influence of Network Resources and Firm Capabilities 
on Alliance Formation. Strategic Management Journal, 20(5), 397-420.  
Gulati, R., Lavie, D., & Singh, H. (2009). The nature of partnering experience and the gains from alliances. 
[Article]. Strategic Management Journal, 30(11), 1213-1233. doi: 10.1002/smj.786 
Gulati, R., Nohria, N., & Zaheer, A. (2000). Strategic Networks. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 203-
215.  
Gulati, R., & Puranam, P. (2009). Renewal Through Reorganization: The Value of Inconsistencies Between 
Formal and Informal Organization. Organization Science, 20(2), 422-440. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1090.0421 
Gupta, A. K., Smith, K. G., & Shalley, C. E. (2006). The interplay between exploration and exploitation. 
Academy of Management Journal, 49(4), 693-706.  
Hagedoorn, J., Link, A. N., & Vonortas, N. S. (2000). Research partnerships. Research Policy, 29(4-5), 567-
586.  
Hall, R. H. (1972). Organizations: Structure andProcess. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall. 
He, Z.-L., & Wong, P.-K. (2004). Exploration vs. Exploitation: An Empirical Test of the Ambidexterity 
Hypothesis. Organization Science, 15(4), 481-494.  
Heiman, B. A., & Nickerson, J. A. (2004). Empirical evidence regarding the tension between knowledge sharing 
and knowledge expropriation in collaborations. Managerial and Decision Economics, 25(6-7), 401-
420.  
  
 
- 19 - 
 
Hoang, H., & Rothaermel, F. T. (2010). Leveraging internal and external experience: exploration, exploitation, 
and R&D project performance. Strategic Management Journal, 9999(9999), n/a.  
Holmqvist, M. (2004). Experiential Learning Processes of Exploitation and Exploration within and between 
Organizations: An Empirical Study of Product Development. Organization Science, 15(1), 70-81.  
Im, G., & Rai, A. (2008). Knowledge sharing ambidexterity in long-term interorganizational relationships. 
Management Science, 54(7), 1281.  
Ireland, R. D., Hitt, M. A., & Vaidyanath, D. (2002). Alliance Management as a Source of Competitive 
Advantage. Journal of Management, 28(3), 413-446. doi: 10.1177/014920630202800308 
Irwin, D. A., & Klenow, P. J. (1996). High-tech R&D subsidies Estimating the effects of Sematech. Journal of 
International Economics, 40(3-4), 323-344.  
Jansen, J. J. P. (2008). Combining competence building and leveraging: Managing paradoxes in ambidextrous 
organizations. Advances in Applied Business Strategy, 10, 99-119.  
Jansen, J. J. P., Tempelaar, M. P., van den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2009). Structural Differentiation 
and Ambidexterity: The Mediating Role of Integration Mechanisms. Organization Science, 20(4), 797-
811. doi: 10.1287/orsc.1080.0415 
Jansen, J. J. P., Van Den Bosch, F. A. J., & Volberda, H. W. (2006). Exploratory Innovation, Exploitative 
Innovation, and Performance: Effects of Organizational Antecedents and Environmental Moderators. 
Management Science, 52(11), 1661-1674.  
Kale, P., & Singh, H. (2007). Building firm capabilities through learning: the role of the alliance learning 
process in alliance capability and firm-level alliance success. Strategic Management Journal, 28(10), 
981-1000.  
Kale, P., Singh, H., & Perlmutter, H. (2000). Learning and Protection of Proprietary Assets in Strategic 
Alliances: Building Relational Capital. Strategic Management Journal, 21(3), 217-237.  
Katz, M. L. (1986). An Analysis of Cooperative Research and Development. The RAND Journal of Economics, 
17(4), 527-543.  
Khanna, T., Gulati, R., & Nohria, N. (1998). The Dynamics of Learning Alliances: Competition, Cooperation, 
and Relative Scope. Strategic Management Journal, 19(3), 193-210.  
Klette, T. J., Møen, J., & Griliches, Z. (2000). Do subsidies to commercial R&D reduce market failures? 
Microeconometric evaluation studies. Research Policy, 29(4-5), 471-495.  
Koza, M. P., & Lewin, A. Y. (1998). The Co-Evolution of Strategic Alliances. Organization Science, 9(3), 255-
264.  
Koza, M. P., & Lewin, A. Y. (1999). The Coevolution of Network Alliances: A Longitudinal Analysis of an 
International Professional Service Network. Organization Science, 10(5), 638-653.  
Koza, M. P., & Lewin, A. Y. (2000). Managing partnerships and strategic alliances: raising the odds of success. 
European Management Journal, 18(2), 146-151.  
Kumar, R., & Nti, K. O. (1998). Differential Learning and Interaction in Alliance Dynamics: A Process and 
Outcome Discrepancy Model. Organization Science, 9(3), 356-367.  
Lavie, D., & Rosenkopf, L. (2006). Balancing exploration and exploitation in alliance formation. Academy of 
Management Journal, 49(4), 797-818.  
Leonard-Barton, D. (1992). Core Capabilities and Core Rigidities: A Paradox in Managing New Product 
Development. Strategic Management Journal, 13, 111-125.  
Levinthal, D. A., & March, J. G. (1993). The Myopia of Learning. Strategic Management Journal, 14, 95-112.  
Levitt, B., & March, J. (1988). Organizational learning. Annual Review of Sociology, 14(1), 319-338.  
Lichtenthaler, U. (2009). Absorptive capacity, environmental turbulence, and the complementarity of 
organizational learning processes. The Academy of Management Journal (AMJ), 52(4), 822-846.  
Lin, Z., Yang, H., & Demirkan, I. (2007). The Performance Consequences of Ambidexterity in Strategic 
Alliance Formations: Empirical Investigation and Computational Theorizing. Management Science, 
53(10), 1645-1658. doi: 10.1287/mnsc.1070.0712 
Link, A. N., Teece, D. J., & Finan, W. F. (1996). Estimating the benefits from collaboration: The case of 
SEMATECH Review of Industrial Organization, Volume 11, Number 5 / October, 1996.  
Linnarsson, H., & Werr, A. (2004). Overcoming the innovation-alliance paradox: a case of an explorative 
alliance. European Journal of Innovation Management 7(1), 45-55.  
Lubatkin, M. H., Simsek, Z., Ling, Y., & Veiga, J. F. (2006). Ambidexterity and Performance in Small-to 
Medium-Sized Firms: The Pivotal Role of Top Management Team Behavioral Integration. Journal of 
Management, 32(5), 646-672. doi: 10.1177/0149206306290712 
March, J. G. (1991). Exploration and Exploitation in Organizational Learning. Organization Science, 2(1), 71-
87.  
March, J. G. (1994). The evolution of evolution. In J. Baum & J. Singh (Eds.), Evolutionary dynamics of 
organizations (pp. 39-49): Oxford University Press, USA. 
  
 
- 20 - 
 
Markham, S. K. (2002). Moving technologies from lab to market. Industrial Research Institute(November-
December).  
Markides, C., & Charitou, C. D. (2004). Competing with Dual Business Models: A Contingency Approach. The 
Academy of Management Executive, 18(3), 22-36.  
Mathews, J. A. (2002). The origins and dynamics of Taiwan's R&D consortia. Research Policy, 31(4), 633-651.  
Mc Namara, P., & Baden-Fuller, C. (2007). Shareholder returns and the exploration-exploitation dilemma: R&D 
announcements by biotechnology firms. Research Policy, 36(4), 548-565.  
Menguc, B., & Auh, S. (2010). Development and return on execution of product innovation capabilities: The 
role of organizational structure. [Article]. Industrial Marketing Management, 39(5), 820-831. doi: 
10.1016/j.indmarman.2009.08.004 
Miles, R. E., & Snow, C. C. (1992). Causes of Failure in Network Organizations. California Management 
Review, 34(4), 53-72.  
Miotti, L., & Sachwald, F. (2003). Co-operative R&D: why and with whom?: An integrated framework of 
analysis. Research Policy, 32(8), 1481-1499.  
Mothe, C., & Quelin, B. V. (2000). Creating competencies through collaboration: The case of EUREKA R&D 
consortia. European Management Journal, 18(6), 590-604.  
Mothe, C., & Quelin, B. V. (2001). Resource creation and partnership in R&D consortia. The Journal of High 
Technology Management Research, 12(1), 113-138.  
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1996). Strategic Alliances and Interfirm Knowledge Transfer. 
Strategic Management Journal, 17, 77-91.  
Mowery, D. C., Oxley, J. E., & Silverman, B. S. (1998). Technological overlap and interfirm cooperation: 
implications for the resource-based view of the firm. Research Policy, 27(5), 507-523.  
Nielsen, B. B. (2010). Strategic fit, contractual, and procedural governance in alliances. [Article]. Journal of 
Business Research, 63(7), 682-689. doi: 10.1016/j.jbusres.2009.05.001 
O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. (2007). Ambidexterity as a Dynamic Capability: Resolving the Innovator's 
Dilemma. Research Papers Series Stanford Graduate School of Business  
O'Reilly, C. A., & Tushman, M. L. (2004). The Ambidextrous Organization. Harvard Business Review(April 
2004), 74-81.  
Olk, P. (1998). A Knowledge-Based Perspective on the Transformation of Individual-Level Relationships Into 
Interorganizational Structures: The Case of R&D Consortia. European Management Journal, 16(1), 
39-49.  
Peck, M. J. (1986). Joint R&D: The case of microelectronics and computer technology corporation. Research 
Policy, 15(5), 219-231.  
Perretti, F., & Negro, G. (2006). Filling empty seats: how status and organizational hierarchies affect 
exploration versus exploitation in team design. Academy of Management Journal, 49(4), 759-777.  
Podolny, J. M., & Page, K. L. (1998). Network Forms of Organization. Annual Review of Sociology, 24(1), 57-
76. doi: doi:10.1146/annurev.soc.24.1.57 
Porter, M., & Fuller, M. B. (1986). Coalitions and Global Strategy. In M. Porter (Ed.), Competition in Global 
Industries. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School. 
Porter, M. E. (1980). Competitive Strategy. New York: Free Press. 
Porter, M. E. (1996). What is strategy? Harvard Business Review(November-December).  
Porter, M. E. (1998). Clusters and the new economics of competition. Harvard Business Review(November-
December), 77-90.  
Powell, W., & Grodal, S. (2005). Networks of Innovators. In J. Fagerberg, D. Mowery & R. Nelson (Eds.), The 
Oxford Handbook of Innovation (pp. 56-85): Oxford University Press. 
Powell, W. W., Koput, K. W., & Smith-Doerr, L. (1996). Interorganizational Collaboration and the Locus of 
Innovation: Networks of Learning in Biotechnology. Administrative Science Quarterly, 41(1), 116-145.  
Prahalad, C. K., & Hamel, G. (1990). The core competence of the organization. Harvard Business Review(May-
June).  
Provan, K. G., & Kenis, P. (2007). Modes of Network Governance: Structure, Management, and Effectiveness. 
J Public Adm Res Theory, mum015. doi: 10.1093/jopart/mum015 
Puhan, T. X. (2008). Balancing Exploration and Exploitation by Creating Organizational Think Tanks (1st ed.): 
Gabler Verlag. 
Raisch, S., & Birkinshaw, J. (2008). Organizational Ambidexterity: Antecedents, Outcomes, and Moderators. 
Journal of Management, 34(3), 375-409. doi: 10.1177/0149206308316058 
Reuer, J. J. (2000). Parent Firm Performance across International Joint Venture Life-Cycle Stages. Journal of 
International Business Studies, 31(1), 1-20.  
Rivkin, J. W., & Siggelkow, N. (2003). Balancing Search and Stability: Interdependencies among Elements 
Organizational Design. Management Science, 49(3), 290-311.  
  
 
- 21 - 
 
Rosenkopf, L., & Nerkar, A. (2001). Beyond Local Search: Boundary-Spanning, Exploration, and Impact in the 
Optical Disk Industry. Strategic Management Journal, 22(4), 287-306.  
Rothaermel, F. T. (2001). Incumbent's Advantage through Exploiting Complementary Assets Via Interfirm 
Cooperation. Strategic Management Journal, 22(6/7), 687-699.  
Rothaermel, F. T., & Deeds, D. L. (2004). Exploration and exploitation alliances in biotechnology: a system of 
new product development. Strategic Management Journal, 25(3), 201-221.  
Sakakibara, M. (1997). Evaluating government-sponsored R&D consortia in Japan: who benefits and how? 
Research Policy, 26(4-5), 447-473.  
Sakakibara, M., & Dodgson, M. (2003). Strategic Research Partnerships: Empirical Evidence from Asia. 
Technology Analysis & Strategic Management, 15(2), 227-245.  
Siggelkow, N. (2001). Change in the Presence of Fit: The Rise, the Fall, and the Renaissance of Liz Claiborne. 
The Academy of Management Journal, 44(4), 838-857.  
Siggelkow, N., & Levinthal, D. A. (2003). Temporarily Divide to Conquer: Centralized, Decentralized, and 
Reintegrated Organizational Approaches to Exploration and Adaptation. Organization Science, 14(6), 
650-669.  
Smith, W., & Tushman, M. (2005). Managing strategic contradictions: A top management model for managing 
innovation streams. Organization Science, 16(5), 522.  
Spence, M. (1984). Cost Reduction, Competition, and Industry Performance. Econometrica, 52(1), 101-121.  
Teece, D., & Pisano, G. (1994). The Dynamic Capabilities of Firms: an Introduction. Ind Corp Change, 3(3), 
537-a-556. doi: 10.1093/icc/3.3.537-a 
Tikoria, J., Banwet, D. K., & Deshmukh, S. G. (2010). Measuring the effectiveness of success factors: A case of 
government funded R&D organisations in India. International Journal of Business Excellence, 3(3), 
279-302. doi: 10.1504/ijbex.2010.033425 
Tiwana, A. (2008). Do bridging ties complement strong ties? An empirical examination of alliance 
ambidexterity. Strategic Management Journal, 29(3), 251-272.  
Tiwana, A., Bharadwaj, A., & Sambamurthy, V. (2004). Organizing for Ambidexterity in Information Systems 
Development: A Knowledge Integration Perspective.   
Tushman, M., & Nadler, D. (1978). Information processing as an integrating concept in organizational design. 
Academy of Management Review, 3(3), 613-624.  
Tushman, M., & O'Reilly, C. A. (1996). Ambidextrous organizations: managing evolutionary and revolutionary 
change. California Management Review, 38(4).  
Van Looy, B., Martens, T., & Debackere, K. (2005). Organizing for continuous innovation: On the 
sustainability of ambidextrous organizations. Creativity and Innovation Management, 14(3), 208-221.  
Zollo, M., & Winter, S. G. (2002). Deliberate Learning and the Evolution of Dynamic Capabilities. 
Organization Science, 13(3), 339-351.  
 
  
  
 
- 22 - 
 
Table 1: Types of cooperative R&D organizations 
Category Learning collaborative R&D organizations 
(LCOs) 
Business cooperative R&D organizations 
(BCOs) 
Hybrid R&D cooperative organizations 
(HCOs) 
Dysfunctional or “stuck in the middle” 
cooperative R&D organizations  
Description  LCOs are established to explore territories 
where technologies are either immature or 
very expensive to develop (Rothaermel & 
Deeds, 2004).   
LCOs put a very marked emphasis on the 
research (“R”) components of the 
innovation process, “enabling partners to 
share tacit knowledge and develop new 
knowledge” (Lavie & Rosenkopf, 2006: 
799).  
The primary intent for business cooperative 
research organizations (BCOs) is to help 
founding firms to establish a successful 
commercial position in a new market.  
BCOs are concentrated more in applied 
research (product development and 
prototype/pilot plants) and 
commercialization stages (Lavie & 
Rosenkopf, 2006). 
Hybrid or ambidextrous cooperative 
organizations (HCOs) connect companies 
that seek to simultaneously maximize 
opportunities for both value creation and 
value capturing (Koza & Lewin, 2000: 
149).  
HCOs combine properties from both learning 
and business collaborative organizations, 
and features of ambidextrous 
organizations.  
Cooperative R&D organizations that suffer 
from an effort dispersion expressed in 
fragmentary activities and unfinished 
projects (Copani et al., 2006) due to the 
inability to pursue an ambidextrous 
position.  
 
Focus Pre-competitive R&D (Aldrich & Sasaki, 
1995: 303) 
Competitive, downstream R&D development 
(Alic, 1990) 
Both pre-competitive and competitive, 
downstream R&D development (Alic, 
1990; Hagedoorn et al., 2000). 
Lack of focus. 
 
Design type Loosely coupled structures, decentralized 
units and informal relations intended to 
facilitate creativity, capability 
development and long-term growth (He & 
Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 2006; Nielsen, 
2010). 
Hierarchical structure, centralized decision-
making and formal controls and 
communication to decrease the risk of 
undesired spillovers and information 
leaks (He & Wong, 2004; Jansen et al., 
2006; Nielsen, 2010). 
Ambidexterity (Duncan, 1976; O'Reilly & 
Tushman, 2004; Tushman & O'Reilly, 
1996).  
Combination of Mechanic and organic 
structures (Burns & Stalker, 1961). 
 Compensatory fit (Gulati & Puranam, 2009) 
Implies tradeoffs between alternatives.  
Design context 
 
Singular, dominant or dominant set of 
functions (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). 
Engineered pattern (Doz et al., 2000) 
Singular, dominant or dominant set of 
functions (Gresov & Drazin, 1997). 
Emergent pattern (Doz et al., 2000) 
Multiple, conflicting set of functions (Gresov 
& Drazin, 1997). Both engineered and 
emergent patterns (Doz et al., 2000) 
Multiple, conflicting set of functions (Gresov 
& Drazin, 1997). Both engineered and 
emergent patterns (Doz et al., 2000). 
Traps  Failure trap (Levinthal & March, 1993) Competency trap (Leonard-Barton, 1992); 
familiarity trap,  maturity trap, and  
propinquity trap (Ahuja & Morris 
Lampert, 2001). 
 
Misfit (Gilbert, 2006; Menguc & Auh, 2010; 
Porter, 1996; Siggelkow, 2001);  
Misfit trap (Tiwana et al., 2004);  
Mismatch (Nielsen, 2010). 
Stuck in the middle (Porter, 1980); Consensus 
trap  (Fiorino, 1997); Low local peaks 
(Siggelkow & Levinthal, 2003); Lack of 
slack resources (Floyd & Lane, 2000).  
Knowledge sharing versus knowledge 
expropriation (Heiman & Nickerson, 
2004), cooperative versus non cooperative 
modes of behavior (Kumar & Nti, 1998). 
Research examples Aldrich and Sasaki (1995); Mowery, Oxley, 
and Silverman (1996); Doz, Olk, & Ring 
(2000); Mothe and Quelin (2001); 
Branstetter and Sakakibara  (2002); Miotti 
and Sachwald (2003); Rothaermel & 
Deeds (2004); Lavie & Rosenkopf (2006). 
Aldrich and Sasaki (1995); Doz, Olk, & Ring 
(2000); Mothe and Quelin (2000); 
Rothaermel (2001); Mathews (2002); 
Argyres and Silverman (2004); 
Rothaermel & Deeds (2004); Powell and 
Grodal (2005); Lavie & Rosenkopf 
(2006); Dodgson, Mathews, and Kastelle 
(2006). 
Koza and Lewin (2000); Lavie & Rosenkopf 
(2006).  
Miles and Snow (1992); Porter (1980, 1998); 
Lin, Yang, & Demirkan (2007).  
The format of this table was adapted from Gresov and Drazin (1997) 
 
  
 
Figure 1:
 
Adapted from Koza and Lewin 
(Note:  refers to a vicious circle inside the quadrant; 
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 Types of R&D consortia and associated traps
(2000), Fiorino (1997) and Tiwana, Bharadwaj and
Movement from one quadrant to another).
Learning 
R&d consortium 
(“failure trap”)  
Ambidextrous 
R&D consortium               
(“misfit trap")
Dysfunctional or 
"Stuck in the middle"
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Business 
r&D consortium 
(“competency trap”)
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